Domestic Relations by Ross, Hugh Alan
Case Western Reserve Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hugh Alan Ross, Domestic Relations, 11 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 372 (1960)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol11/iss3/13
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The majority failed to consider whether, under the murder-felony
rule, one charged with a murder committed by a co-conspirator can
exculpate himself by proving that he was under duress at the time of
the commission of the felony." Further, it is not possible to deter-
mine from the court's opinion whether its decision would have been
the same had Milam not been under duress, i.e., was the basis of the
court's decision that Milam was under duress, or that the robbery
and/or the conspiracy had terminated prior to the killing of Lentz?
These two cases, both difficult to resolve, sharply contrast dif-
fering concepts of the scope of review. No value judgment can be
made as to the verity of either approach; nor is it possible to appraise
the societal benefit of the result - namely, the punishment of the
questionable sodomist and the vindication of the errant bumpkin.
Only this can be concluded: The Aristotelian maxim, 'A government
of laws is preferable to that of men,' if amended to conform to real-





A substantial number of courts have held that laches and estoppel
are important factors when foreign ex parte divorces are attacked on
jurisdictional grounds. In Davis v. Davis,' the court upheld a Mexi-
can divorce based upon the personal appearance of the plaintiff-hus-
band, plus two weeks residence in Mexico. The Ohio court pointed
out that the Mexican finding of jurisdiction over subject matter was
entitled to a strong presumption of validity; the court also empha-
sized that the wife knew of the Mexican decree, but waited nineteen
months before bringing suit to attack it.2
DIVORCE
Procedure in Divorce Cases
Both cases in this area involved the interrelationship between the
law of divorce and the law of minority. In Johnson v. Johnson,3 the
court held that a minor wife can establish a domicil for divorce pur-
poses different from that of her husband, and implied that she can
establish a domicil different from that of her parents. The other
case held that where a husband cross-petitions for a divorce against
his minor wife, the wife must be represented by a guardian ad litem.4
41. See State v. Moretti, 66 Wash. 537, 120 Pac. 102 (1912), which held that participation
in a robbery under duress was not a defense in a prosecution for murder.
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Alimony
In Goetzel v. Goetzel,5 the supreme court pointed out that since
the statutory amendment of 1953 which granted equity powers to
the divorce courts,6 the court has authority to order the transfer of
real property in an alimony only action. In this case the wife peti-
tioned for alimony and asked the court to compel performance of an
agreement by the husband to convey certain real estate to her. The
divorce court granted alimony but did not mention the realty in its
decree. The supreme court held that the decree was an implied
denial of the request for conveyance, and res judicata barred a subse-
quent action in equity for specific performance of the contract.
Child Support and Custody
The courts of appeals have been in disagreement over the power
of a divorce court to handle issues of child support and custody where
the court has denied the petition for divorce or alimony. Three
courts of appeals7 have held that the court had no such jurisdiction,
either to handle the child by its own order, or to certify the question
to the juvenile court. Two courts of appeals" have held that there
was jurisdiction and that the divorce court must make some disposi-
tion of the child. The conflict has finally been settled in Haynie v.
Haynie,' where the supreme court held that the divorce court could
not certify the case to the juvenile court. The decision also implies
that the divorce court has no authority to settle the issue by its own
decree.
In Bastian v. Bastian,10 the trial court found that the father was
best suited to have custody of the child, but gave custody to the
mother because the separation agreement, incorporated in the divorce
decree, so provided. The court of appeals reversed, pointing out
that the provisions of an agreement relative to alimony are binding
1. 156 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio C-P. 1959). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws section, p.
354 supra.
2. Laches not a factor: Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940); Smerda
v. Smerda, 74 N.E.2d 751 (Ohio C.P. 1947). Laches a factor: In re Sayle's Estate, 80 N.E.2d
221 (Ohio P. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 80 N.E.2d 229 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
3. 159 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio C.P. 1959). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws section, p.
354 supra.
4. Evans v. Evans, 161 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959). See also discussion in Civil
Procedure section, p. 348 supra.
5. 169 Ohio St. 350, 159 N.E.2d 751 (1959).
6. Omo REv. CODE § 3105.20.
7. Lewis v. Lewis, 144 N.E.2d 887 (Ohio Ct App. 1956); Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 21 Ohio
L. Abs. 590 (Ct. App. 1936); Gatton v. Gatton, 41 Ohio App. 397, 179 N.E. 745 (1931).
8. Muntzinger v. Muntzinger, 89 Ohio App. 281, 101 N.E.2d 227 (1950); South v. South,
5 Ohio L. Abs. 594 (Ct. App. 1927).
9. 169 Ohio St. 467, 159 N.E.2d 765 (1959).
10. 160 N.E.2d 133 (Ohio C. App. 1959).
1960]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
on the court, but that the welfare of the child is the governing factor
in a custody decision, and this issue cannot be controlled by agreement
of the parties.
In Noble v. Noble," a case of first impression in Ohio, a common
pleas court held that it had jurisdiction to determine child custody in-
cident to an ex parte Ohio divorce, where the mother and child were
residents of Ohio and the father was a non-resident over whom the
court had no personal jurisdiction. The court conceded that the de-
cree would not be entitled to full faith and credit in other states, 2
but concluded, and in the writer's opinion correctly so, that the status
of the parties should be settled insofar as Ohio is concerned, and that
the decree might be entitled to recognition elsewhere on the principle
of comity. 13
The converse of the Noble case is the ex parte Ohio divorce
where the defendant and the child, being outside the jurisdiction,
make no personal appearance; the court awards custody to the non-
resident defendant and orders the Ohio plaintiff to pay for the child's
support. This procedure was upheld in Handelsman v. Handelsm an'4
by the court of appeals.
Modification and Enforcement
Alimony, Support and Custody Decrees
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that where a continuing ali-
mony decree is based upon a separation agreement, and neither the
agreement nor the decree reserves jurisdiction to modify, alimony
cannot be modified or terminated by a decree based upon changed cir-
cumstances. 5 In Hunt v. Hunt,6 the supreme court established an
exception to the rule, holding that alimony could be terminated by
the court on proof that the wife had remarried. The court treated
the remarriage as an election by the wife to look to her new husband
for support. In this case the court terminated the alimony obligation
of the husband as of the date of the termination decree, although
other jurisdictions have made the termination order retroactive to
the date of the remarriage.' 7
The supreme court also held that the statute of limitations did
11. 160 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio C.P. 1959). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws section, p.
355 supra.
12. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
13. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in May v. Anderson, supra note 12, at
535.
14. 108 Ohio App. 30, 160 N.E.2d 543 (1958).
15. Mozden v. Mozden, 162 Ohio St. 169, 122 N.E.2d 295 (1954); Newman v. Newman,
161 Ohio St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954).
16. 169 Ohio St. 276, 159 N.E.2d 430 (1959). See also discussion in Equity section,
p. 378 infra.
17. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1949).
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not apply to the enforcement of child-support payments, and laches
did not bar enforcement fourteen years after the last installment be-
came due.'
MARRIAGE
Marriage between first cousins is prohibited by an Ohio statute,'"
and there are conflicting decisions as to whether such a marriage is
void or voidable. In Mazzolini v. Mazzolini,20 the supreme court de-
cided that the marriage was voidable. In this case the marriage was
between Ohio residents, but it took place in Massachusetts, which
does not prohibit first-cousin marriages. The Ohio court followed
the orthodox conflicts rule: look to the law of the state of marriage,
including its conflicts law.21 Massachusetts (by statute) follows the
minority conflicts rule that a marriage within the state is void if it is
void in the state of residence of the parties, but is valid if the mar-
riage would have been voidable in the state of residence. This Mas-
sachusetts rule referred the Ohio court back to Ohio substantive law,
and the court then determined the effect of such a marriage in Ohio.
The court did not pass on the issue, but presumably a marriage which
is voidable for choice-of-law purposes is voidable rather than void
for other purposes, i.e., collateral attack would not be allowed, laches
or unclean hands would bar annulment, and so forth.
A condition in a will or deed which tends to encourage the termi-
nation of a marriage is generally held to be void as against public
policy, although a condition which provides financial support for a
party who might suffer economically from the termination is valid.
This distinction was made in Fineman v. Central National Bank of
Cleveland,2" where the testator established a trust to pay the income
to his son for the duration of the trust, with a contingent remainder
interest in the corpus to the son upon termination of the trust. The
termination clause provided for termination upon the dissolution of
the son's present marriage, either by death or divorce. The court
held that the termination clause was a monetary inducement to di-
vorce, and struck out the divorce phrase, leaving the son as benefi-
ciary until the death of his wife.
GUARDIANSHIP
In a 1957 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held that where a
child was physically present in the state, the Ohio court could rede-
18. Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447, 156 N.E.2d 113 (1959). See also discussion in
Equity section, p. 378 infra.
19. OmIo REV. CODE § 3101.01. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.07, criminal statute on incest.
20. 168 Ohio St. 357, 155 NXE.2d 206 (1958).
21. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 357 (3d ed. 1949).
22. 161 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959). See also discussion in Wills and Decedents' Estates
section, p. 451 infra.
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termine the issue of custody, and was not bound by a California di-
vorce decree which attempted to settle the issue.23 The court's ra-
tionale was that the policy basis of a custody determination, "what is
for the best interest of the child," outweighs the interest of certainty
and finality of litigation, which is the basis of the full faith and credit
clause. In Fore v. Toth,24 the supreme court extended the same rule
to the guardianship of a minor child. In the Fore case, both parents
were dead and the child resided with an aunt in Ohio. The child's
domicile, as determined by the common-law rules, was in Louisiana,
which was the domicile of the deceased parents and the grandparents.
The probate court in Louisiana appointed the grandmother guardian
of the person and estate, and the probate court in Ohio appointed the
aunt guardian of the person and estate. The grandmother came to
Ohio and asked for custody in a habeas corpus action, demanding
recognition of her guardianship decree under the full faith and credit
clause. The supreme court denied the grandmother's claim, pointing
out that the primary interest was the welfare of the child, that this
was as true in guardianship cases as it was in divorce cases, and that
Ohio has just as much interest in the welfare of its residents as Loui-
siana has in persons domiciled within its jurisdiction.
Whether the decision would be upheld by the United States Su-
preme Court is not certain. In the cases in which child custody was
an incident of the divorce decree, the United States Supreme Court
has not yet decided whether the state of residence can pass on custody
where no changes in circumstances have occurred since the issuance of
the foreign decree. 25
ILLEGITIMACY
There were three interesting cases in this area. In a criminal non-
support case, the defendant was permitted to contest paternity, even
though he had already been adjudicated the father in a paternity ac-
tion.2 The court did not give the reason for the decision, other than
to cite an ambiguous statute. The reason that res judicata does not
apply is that the standard of proof in the latter case (criminal) is
higher than it is in the paternity case (civil). In the second case of
interest, the Ohio Supreme Court pointed out that a paternity action
is essentially civil in nature, and that liberal amendment of the plead-
ings should be allowed. 8 In the third case, a court of appeals was
23. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 166 Ohio St. 203, 141 N.E.2d 172 (1957), Ross, Domes-
tic Relations, Survey of Ohio Law - 1957, 9 WEST. REs. L. REv. 315 (1958).
24. 168 Ohio St. 363, 155 N.E.2d 194 (1958).
25. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958), Ross, Domestic Relations, Survey of Ohio Law
- 1958, 10 WEST. REs. L. REv. 394 (1959).
26. State v. Lockwood, 160 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
27. OHIo REv. CODE § 3111.17.
28. Taylor v. Scott, 168 Ohio St. 391, 155 N.E.2d 884 (1959). See also discussion in Civil
Procedure section, p. 347 supra.
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